failed modern state

A failed modern state
1- Hostility toward any change
2- Survival as the ultimate end.
3- They are not dialectical and unable to be
4- They are unable to establish the relationships neither with their inside i.e. people nor with the outside i.e. world community.
5- In a state of perpetual crisis
6- Crisis is the condition of their survival.
7- A state against the nation
8- Nation or people is imagined or imaginary nor real
9- Any event is a catastrophe
10- The logic is keep your hand to save your arm
11- The state is the owner of the people, the air, the land, the water, the animals, the love, the stones, the feeling, the will, etc.
Violence as main method of communication

Definition

A failed modern state is a model applied to explain the sort of states in the Arab Middle East. This also is more elaborated through a study of the nature and the behaviour of that form of state. This type of state cannot be understood comprehensively according to any other models. The other models like development theory, functional theory and historical theory are inadequate to explain the exceptional nature of the states in the Middle East.
The failed modern state is a state in between. Between modern and tradition.
The state in the region has no history, no trajectory. It did not develop as the result of the internal social changes. The state is not the desire of the people. It is not an institute to accommodate people’s need. When the state as a hierarchal decision making organisation, is alien to the society, this will raise a question about the existence of other related concepts, namely nation and nationalism. Since the dominant, if it is not the only one, model of the state in the world is a nation state; the states in the Arab Middle East are states in search for their nation.

Iraq for instance since its inception in the 1920s, has never cohered as a nation. In this sense, it is a failed state. Successive leaders of Iraq have failed to craft a national identity capable of transcending tense sectarian and ethnic divides, and, as a result, Iraq has historically been held together by a powerful, violent, central government. This is true also in Lebanon. The other states in the Middle East despite the dominance of the Arab speaking the feeling and affiliation of a nation has never been established. There are many factors behind that failure. Firstly in general, while the term Arab in modern times is applied to a large group of different peoples that share in common the Arabic language in fact the overwhelming majority of them the Arabic is not their original tongue. The Arabic is the tongue that has been imposed on their forefathers by the Muslim conquerors. Therefore the association with Arabic as a form of an identity is weak and in many places non-existence.

The condition or fact of not achieving the desired end or ends, it is state of an attempt, which has not resulted in the required plan. Taking the Arab states in the Middle East as a Failed Modern States indicates that those states are entered the modernity but as the result they fail to become modern. If modernity is the antitheses of the tradition therefore those state failed in their efforts to make a rupture with their tradition. In the other word they have arrived at modernity without fully leaving their traditions. Leaving tradition does not necessarily means dumping the tradition. The leaving is ability to read the tradition from the modern eye.

Failed Modern State is state in between. It is neither modern nor tradition. It is both and none. It is hybrid. The characteristics of this type of states are differing from any other known states.

The Middle East today is the "great exception" in terms of societal and political progress. In the last decade and a half, since the collapse of the former Soviet Union, authoritarian regimes have been making way for reform across the globe. In the Middle East, however, authoritarian rule, presiding over sluggish development, remains the norm. Almost without exception, the region remains divided between nationalist-military dictatorships of varying degrees of severity, and traditional, monarchical forms of government. Neither of these forms of governance has succeeded in developing successful, advanced economies or educated, mobile societies. The aim of this essay is to look into some of the processes that enable this situation to continue and to examine possible explanations for this state of affairs. The matter will be considered both through observation of region-wide aspects and by focusing on the specific experiences of a number of countries in the region. The countries to be studied include Egypt and Syria as well as a brief study of Saudi Arabia. Having completed the short foci on the experiences of the three countries named above, the article will conclude by attempting to locate and identify the key factors militating against domestically produced "regime change" in the countries of the Middle East.
The general failure of Middle Eastern regimes to develop adequately the populations and societies that they control is an often-acknowledged aspect of the region. The statistics detailing failure in this regard have been catalogued in the UN Arab Human Development Report series. This series of annual reports depicts a region possessing impressive natural resources, yet beset by socio-political failure.


A brief survey of Marxist and Weberian political thought will show clearly how such thought is developmental, and conceives history in a dynamic way. This dynamic vision of history had, in fact, shaped both Marx's and Weber’s notion of the state. The state for them is the apparatus of government, administration, and an instrument of coercion, and is in a Marx considered the society’s mode of production, more specifically the production relations, as the basic foundation on which the political and other institutions arise.6 Accordingly, the state as a political institution is, for him, a manifestation of the dominant mode of production within the society, and varies according to variation in this mode of production. The state in this sense serves the interest of the economically dominant class, which manages to control the civil bureaucracy as well as the military and police apparatus. Therefore, the state in pursuing its policy becomes fully guided (not autonomous) by the interests of this class. State policy is the political expression of such interest.
On the other hand, Weber believes that the state has its own interest totally separate from the interest of any social group within the society. The state, according to him, emerges as part of a general trend toward rationalizing the society according to impersonal, universal, and general rules. In this sense the state is understood as a rationalized bureaucratic organization working according to general, universal, and impersonal rules that are devoted to specific ends established by the state itself. These rules make the state immune from the influence of society. In implementing these rules the state tends to monopolize the means of coercion within well-defined territories.7 The state according to this concept is fully autonomous in pursuing its own policy and is not subject to the influence of any social force/class within the society, as in the case of the Marxist concept.
Clearly, the two notions converge on what the state is, but they separate when it comes to the relationship between state and society. While the Marxist notion reduces the state to a specific social force/class within the society, and identifies coercive force as the essence of the state for protecting the interest of the said social force/class, the Weberian one regards the state as neutral. It emerges within the context of a general sociological process rationalizing society according to legal rules and principles. Such rules and principles constitute the essence of the state, and coercive force comes as a necessity to preserve these means of protecting society’s welfare.
The 20th Century’s State Theories



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A few comments by Deleuze (from _Foucault_) that might help with the themeof a micro-physical analysis of the State:"As a postulate of localization, power would be power of the State andwould itself be located in the machinery of State to the point where even'private' powers would only apparently be dispersed and would remain nomore than a special examply of the machinery of State. Foucault showsthat, on the contrary, the State itself appears as the overall effect orresult of a series of interacting whells or structures which are located ata completely different level, and which constitute a 'microphysics ofpower'. Not only private systems but explicit parts of the machinery ofState have an origin, a behaviour and a function which the State ratifies,controls or is even content to cover rather than institute." (pg. 25)"It is as if finally, something new were emerging in the wake of Marx. Itis as if a complicity about the State were finally broken. Foucault is notcontent to say that we must rethink certain notions; he does not even sayit; he just does it, and in this way proposes new co-ordinates for praxis.In the background a battle begins to brew, with its local tactics andoverall strategies which advance not by totalizing but by relaying,connecting, converging and prolinging. The question ultimately is: whatis to be done? The theoretical privlege given to the State as a apparatusof power to a certain extent leads to the practice of a leading andcentralizing party which enventually wins State power; but on the otherhand it is this very organizational conception of the party that isjustified by this theory of power. the stakes of Foucault's book lie in adifferent theory, a different praxis of struggle, a different set ofstrategies." (pg. 30)This chapter ("A New Cartographer") is loaded with useful insights forFoucault and the State.Having used Deleuze as an opening crutch, I would like to make a fewcomments in response to "Examhell's" post:> Yet, why crucial? If we agree with Gordon's comments in the opening>chapter of THE FOUCAULT EFFECT (cf. pp. 3-4), we can address this importance>by way of the (Neo-) Marxist critique of Foucault's attention to microphysics>of power in DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH. How can we address government in terms of>a microphysics of power? The Neo-Marxist asks, "How can we address the>relation between society and the state or the sovereign without looking at the>body of government in relation to the body politic?" Is Foucault's answer>that a plurality of forms of government demands an analysis of power operating>at its extremities (as in the double upward and downward movements of>governance in La Mothe Le Voyer's treatise)?I think the wording of the last sentence here might send Foucault back intothe vaccum of State theory, where an analysis of power begins with thestate and traces its effects in the "extremities" of a social body. Inother words, this might lead one towards a "descending" analysis of power(which F. lamented in P/K). Foucault's point, I think, is that power onlyexists in its local manifestations, in the particular points through whichit passes, and that the state is a 'resonance chamber' (to use Deleuze andGuattari's language) or space of articulation and codification of as manypower relations as possible (not a site of condensation as Hall and manyother cs folks want to rewrite F.).> Gordon explains (and Foucault explicitly agrees in "Politics and the>Study of Discourse") that the microphysical method deployed in DISCIPLINCE AND>PUNISH need not be changed to address the macro question of the relation>between society and the state. Yet, in addressing the macro question with>micro method, Foucault seems to be moving along the lines of a distancing from>the reduction of the art of governing to the exercise of a sovereign power to>govern (to hold territory). In doing so, however, the essay in no way turns>away from the analysis of the state. Yet, rather than a critique of the state>are we reading a critique of the state-form? In short, how is it that the>micro-method is necessary and how is it that it allows attention to the state>without embracing state theory - "State theory attempts to deduce the modern>activities of government from the essential properties and propensities of the>state, in particular its supposed propensity to grow and to swallow up or>colonize everything outside itself (Gordon, p.4)." Once a plurality of forms>of governance are recognized as immanent to the state, can a history of>government that functions by way of state theory be tenable, or helpful?First of all, I think Foucault is not engaged in "state theory". Ithink the answer to this question is found throuought _Discipline andPunish_, a text which contemporary governmentality studies folks havetended to push aside to their detriment. If you think back to D&P where Ftries to outline the shift from 'soveriegn power' to 'disciplinary power',he says quite clearly that it is not as a result of the humanitarians, thejurists, the politicians, or any conscious action or tactic which can beattributed to a state apparatus. The shift occurs because of a breakdownin a localized manifestation of soveriegn power, the danger of conflict inthe spectacle of the scaffold. So, the movement from one 'technology' ofpower to another occurs not through a tactical manipulation by the stateapparatus (as state theorists might say), but from local fissures whichbegin to disrupt the functioning of that particular technology.Further, the development of disciplinary power, or modern power,moves by the gradual implementation of microphysical tactics, the placementof the hand on rifle and angle of the arm and fingers when writing, untilla complex web of power relations became implemented in localized settings.The particular form which the modern state adopts, Foucault seems to besaying, is then an effect of these local power relations (not visa-versa).Consider, for example, where he talks about Napoleon (on page 141) and howthe form of his regime was organized upon a disciplinary mechanism ofpower. So, Foucault would absolutely not say that the state 'swallows upor colonizes everything outside itself', rather it is itself an effect ofthose connections which it makes to the mechanisms of power which arediffuse and local.There is another interesting way to make this point. In "Subjectand Power", Foucault defines government as the "conduct of conduct" and in"Governmentality" as the "disposition of things". So, one can governoneself, a family, a car, dog, nation, state ... . Governmentality, itseems to me, is a certain form which is immanent in numerous (but not everysince there is a "multiple regime of governmentality"--Gordon, pg. 36) actsof government. Governmentality, therefore, is not about how the stateapparatus controls a population or populations and the various institutionsand how the are distributed throughout society (as many governmentalitystudies folks have tried to demonstrate), but rather a certain logic thatis in the connection or *between* various relations and mechanisms ofpower. A particular governmental rationality determines the form/functionof the state (but not only the state) and not the other way around.I've rambled. Hope this makes some sense.Geographical categorizations, which are then used as premises of exclusion, have historically been very common in architectural knowledge as well. Architectural history and the canon is still written and taught in schools by employing tired categories such as the "Western" and the "non-Western". It seems that a geographical "other", the "non-West", is sharply inscribed in our imaginations, which in turn influences pedagogical, disciplinary, and professional concerns, not only in European and North American countries, but also in countries that fall into the category of the "non-West". But the word "non-West" not only refers to and maintains the ideology of an exaggerated difference between the "West" and its "other", but it also disavows the differences within these "others" themselves. It completely undermines the centuries-long hybridizations between these geographical zones, their intertwined histories, the effects they made in each other's cultural imagination, as if a "pure West" and a "pure East" can exist. Moreover, today maintaining the imaginary border between the "West" and its geographical "other" can hardly create any critical strategy in responding fruitfully to the current political conflicts. The response to this situation can hardly be achieved by avoiding the terms, however. Pretending that these constructions have never existed or ignoring the perceived contrast and hierarchy between the "West" and its geographical "other" does not offer an alternative, but merely disavow a fact. It serves as a disinterested ignorance, rather than a confrontation with the problem. Therefore, I suggest continuing the discussion to undo the hierarchies reflected in the term "non-West" not simply by avoiding the term, but by treating it in distancing and ironical quotation marks. This will destabilize geographical exclusions by confronting and patiently criticizing their consequences.[2] Matt